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Abstract 
A common conclusion of studies on Central America’s democracies and political economy 
is that the weakness of institutions and the strength of elites are a main reason for the re-
gion’s problems. Recently, a set of studies have attempted to scrutinize these elites in detail, 
focussing on their strategies and resources. The purpose of this article is to reflect upon what 
these studies can tell us about the question: what is strong when institutions are weak? I 
argue that in the Northern Triangle particularly the answer is elite networks and their com-
mand over and competition for the control over four sets of resources: money, means of 
force, information, and ideas and ideologies, including religion. A systematic study of such 
networks and how they interact with formal institutions may give us a more realistic view of 
the current state of Central American political economies. Keywords: Central America, ins-
titutions, political economy, elites, networks. 
Resumen: Hacia una economía política de instituciones débiles y élites fuertes en 
Centroamérica 
Una conclusión común a la que llegan los estudios sobre la economía política y las demo-
cracias centroamericanas es que la debilidad de las instituciones y la fuerza de las élites son 
una razón fundamental para los problemas de la región. Últimamente, una serie de estudios 
han intentado estudiar a fondo dichas élites, enfocándose en sus estrategias y recursos. El 
objetivo del presente artículo es reflexionar sobre lo que dichos estudios pueden aportarnos 
a la respuesta de la pregunta: ¿qué es fuerte cuando las instituciones son débiles? Yo sosten-
go que en el Triángulo Norte, en particular, la respuesta son las redes de las élites y su con-
trol, así como su competencia por dicho control, de cuatro categorías de recursos: el dinero, 
los medios de coacción, la información y las ideas e ideologías, incluida la religión. Un es-
tudio sistemático de dichas redes y sobre cómo interactúan con las instituciones formales 
podría facilitarnos una visión más realista del estado actual de las economías políticas cen-
troamericanas. Palabras clave: Centroamérica, instituciones, economía política, élites, 
redes. 
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Over the last two decades, Central America has gone through remarkable trans-
formation processes: from civil war to peace, from authoritarian regimes to 
institutional democracies, from inward-looking development strategies to 
openness and global markets, and from military to civilian control of politics. 
However, in spite of many positive changes, security has worsened in most of 
the region. The Northern Triangle in particular lags behind the rest of Latin 
America regarding inequality and poverty reduction, education and a number 
of other social indicators (CEPAL, 2013). Moreover, with the exception of 
Nicaraguans, Central Americans are more pessimistic than other Latin Ameri-
cans regarding the development of their democracies and the general path of 
their home countries (Latinobarómetro, 2014, pp. 22, 45).  
 When discussing the causes of Central America’s misery, many point to the 
combination of strong elites and weak institutions. For example, in the intro-
duction to the recent Handbook of Central American Governance, Diego 
Sánchez-Ancochea and Salvador Martí i Puig (2014, p. 4) state that ‘The re-
gion’s problems ultimately have much to do with the perpetuation of an elite-
dominated socio-political system that still concentrates wealth and political 
influence in a small number of people, and also with the inability of the state to 
secure the rule of law and provide services for all’. This view accords with an 
increasing consensus in the literature, that a main explanation for differences in 
development performance across countries over time is variation in institutions 
(Levitsky and Murillo, 2009; Robinson, 2012; Fukuyama, 2011). Economically 
prosperous countries are characterized by inclusive political institutions, mean-
ing that they are both centralized (i.e., that institutions have ensured sufficient 
control over a geographical area) and pluralized (i.e., that there exists an agreed 
division of power) (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p. 81). In contrast, when 
institutions place few constraints on the exercise of power by the elite, re-
sources are extracted from society rather than employed productively.  
 In spite of this, studies of how elites strengthen or undermine institutions in 
Central America are scarce. This might be interpreted as a result of a general 
crisis of political economy in Latin America. Luna, Murillo and Schrank 
(2014) argue that while Latin American political economy has a long and 
proud tradition, recently the field has been too dominated by causal analysis 
based on large, readily available datasets collected by international institutions 
that have little relevance for current Latin American challenges. The crisis is 
even more acute in Central America where many countries fail to produce data 
of sufficient quality to be included even in quantitative studies. The result is 
that studies often conclude by diagnosing Central America with deficits and 
failures in comparison to fixed standards of democracy, good governance or 
rule of law, but without going further into the actual interplay between political 
and economic processes.  
 Nevertheless, a number of recent studies (including some in which I have 
been involved) have attempted to collect and systematize information on as-
pects of elites and how they interact with institutions: who the elites are, what 
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resources they control and what practices they employ to protect their privileg-
es and amass wealth and influence in rapidly changing global and local con-
texts. The aim in this article is to reflect upon what these studies jointly can tell 
us about dominating practices of elites in contexts of weak institutions, and 
sketch an agenda for further inquiry.  
What is strong when institutions are weak? Elites and their networks 
The role of elites in development has received increasing attention over the 
past years (Amsden, Di Caprio & Robinson, 2013). A main reason is that their 
choices crucially strengthen or undermine institutions, particularly state institu-
tions as the permanent institutional core of political authority upon which re-
gimes rest and depend (Centeno, 2002, p. 2). Elite choices affect the centraliza-
tion of power in the state, the ability to extract resources from society and the 
establishment of a monopoly on legitimate violence; all are pre-requisites for 
the emergence of a state that in turn can take on distributive functions and cre-
ate a sense of integrated community and citizenship. These basic features are 
also necessary to enable the state to play an active role in development, as well 
as to oversee legal and contractual instruments that guarantee protection of 
property, set the rules of the game and reduce transaction costs.  
 The vast literature on the evolution of strong institutions has focused on 
historical ruptures (e.g., war) but also elite choices in ‘critical junctures’ (Lip-
set and Rokkan, 1967; Collier and Collier, 1991; Kurtz, 2013) and state-
supported political settlements between different societal groups (Thelen, 
2004). In Central America, the peace processes and democratization of the 
1990s can be considered such a critical juncture and a window of opportunity 
to allow for a strengthening of institutions. The fact that it did not result in in-
stitutional strengthening may be explained by the fact that democratization was 
not supported by a strong democratic actor, but rather by pressure from outside 
and the US decision to support the removal of the armies from politics in Cen-
tral America (Torres Rivas, 2014, p. 2).  
 However, weak institutions are not only the result of failures at critical 
junctures, but also a result of everyday practices. Weak institutions have in 
common that they fail to make democratic and legal institutions the framework 
for legal and legitimate action. They can be considered as resources that can be 
mobilized by one actor in competition against another. Weak institutions have 
distinct anatomies that can be considered as failed, captured, or penetrated. 
These characteristics are not permanent conditions but dynamic processes, 
maintained by everyday practices. Thus, in order to understand why and how 
weak or strong institutions evolve, we must also consider how key actors relate 
to weak institutional contexts and how the practices they apply contribute to 
further weakening or strengthening. In other words, we have to ask: what is 
strong when institutions are weak? 
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 In order to attempt an answer to this question, we need a better understand-
ing of who the key actors are. As argued above, elites are central among them. 
However, the term elites is most commonly used without being defined, and is 
often simply implicitly equated with the upper class, capitalists or ‘the right’. 
Here I will define elites as groups of individuals that, due to their control over 
natural, economic, political, social, organizational, symbolic (exper-
tise/knowledge) or coercive resources, stand in a privileged position to formal-
ly or informally influence decisions and practices that have broad societal im-
pact (for a further discussion see Bull, 2015). This definition differs from one 
which focusses on distinct institutional and functional elites (e.g., military 
elites, parliamentary elites, bureaucratic elites), since in contexts of weak insti-
tutions it is impossible to clearly distinguish among them. Instead, as evi-
denced in both historical and more recent studies, in Central America the main 
actors are the elites and the networks in which they are embedded. These net-
works traverse institutions, and enable elites to mobilize multiple resources that 
in turn further undermine institutions.  
 Elite networks may be defined as a set of elite actors that jointly control and 
share resources. Networks may be local or national and they are increasingly 
transnational and often tightly connected across various levels (Anonymous, 
2011). Networks can penetrate institutions with their ideas and resources, be-
coming more important for institutions than the formal functioning of an insti-
tution in society. At its most extreme this leads to what Garay, Salcedo and de 
León (2010, p. 21) called a ‘co-opted reconfiguration of the State’: a process 
by which institutions are manipulated by such networks from the inside.  
 In Central America, networks necessarily include both economic and politi-
cal actors, and the distinction is often blurred. A recent study of the transna-
tional economy in Central America found that the existing large family-owned 
diversified business groups still dominate. As predicted in the literature, these 
are substitutes for strong institutions and well-functioning financial markets, as 
they allow for the internalization of many functions normally dependent on 
such institutions (Bull, Castellacci & Kasahara, 2014). In addition, business 
groups are embedded in larger networks of co-investors, mutual shareholder-
ships, and kinship. Thus, the economy is largely governed by different combi-
nations of business hierarchies (within local business groups and transnational 
companies), formal institutions and networks (Bull et al., 2014, ch. 9). Particu-
larly in the Northern Triangle, political-economic elite networks have emerged 
as the most important element providing predictability in highly volatile con-
texts.  
 These networks are based on close ties between businessmen, politicians 
and military actors in addition to academics, journalists and public officials. 
They are held together by family ties, mutual shareholdership (in companies), 
memberships in the same organizations, joint ideas or ideologies or friendship, 
ranging from long term amistades to mutually agreed-upon instrumental inter-
changes of favours. Also ethnicity may contribute to strengthen networks, as in 
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the case of networks among businesses owned by individuals and families of 
Arab origin (turcos) in Honduras (Euraque, 2014). Kinship has been consid-
ered the most important factor tying elite networks together historically 
(Casaús Arzù, 1992), and it is still of importance in the transnational economy.  
 For businesses, networks serve many functions: to pool capital for invest-
ment, to solve conflicts, and to overcome formal legal constraints. These net-
works become no less important in a transnationally integrated open economy. 
On the contrary, there are many examples of local groups benefitting from their 
role in these networks when competing or seeking to collaborate with multina-
tional companies (MNCs). Only by allying with partners in local networks are 
MNCs are able to fulfill formal requirements as well as overcome informal 
obstacles to investments. At its most extreme, the capacity of Central American 
companies in dealing with institutional weaknesses has given them their main 
competitive advantage.  
The resources and practices of elites 
Social mobility is low in Central America and elite groups are generally diffi-
cult to penetrate by racially subaltern actors. Nevertheless, ascendance into an 
elite network can be attained by achieving positions in formal institutions (the 
government, a political party, the military, a company, etc.), or by attending 
certain schools or universities. However, also new groups may enter into elite 
networks and alternative elite networks are established. It is not only las famil-
ias de siempre that are able to accumulate wealth and power. We see the as-
cendance of individuals with no elite background that are able to penetrate into 
elite groups through forming a combination of local networks and international 
alliances based on the control of such resources. These groups may include the 
so-called operadores políticos (political ‘fixers’) or business consultants that 
are able to influence politics and accumulate wealth more through their net-
works than their formal positions.  
 These may become parts of elite networks through controlling four types of 
resources that are of importance to the elites’ positions: The first is money. 
Money is an obvious part of any ‘political economy’: having or controlling 
access to money is a source of power, and ‘money talks’ in strong institutional 
contexts. Thanks to a number of recent studies in Central America we do know 
something about changes in accumulation of capital and thus the concentration 
of monetary resources (Segovia, 2005; Robles, 2014; Palencia Prado, 2014; 
Bull and Kasahara, 2014). These show a combination of strengthened, older 
elite groups and the emergence of new ones, as well as new transnational con-
figurations of business elites. However, what distinguishes weak institutional 
contexts is the simultaneous weak regulation of private economic transactions 
and of public-private interaction. Opaque financing of political campaigns is a 
well-known issue as is buying votes in congress, considered to be widespread 
in Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, in addition to general corruption and 
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bribery. Indeed, it has been argued that politics in Guatemala increasingly re-
semble transactions in a market place where different ‘political operators’ rep-
resenting private interests are negotiating in a system of intense competition for 
political influence (Briscoe and Rodríguez, 2010).  
 It is not only private money that ensures access to public institutions, and as 
a result, undermines them. In spite of rhetoric on the benefits of a small state 
keeping business relations at arm’s length, public procurement is still a main 
source of income for the private sector. A government which has access to re-
sources and issues attractive contracts is also more able to ensure the private 
sector’s cooperation. The importance of public wealth to ensure private sector 
support became particularly evident during the years of the Ortega administra-
tion in Nicaragua. Propped up by Venezuelan credits and smoothed over by 
business-friendly policies, the government had a cordial relationship with busi-
ness in spite of the apparent existence of deep ideological differences (Spal-
ding, 2014).  
 The second main resource is means of force. While money is an important 
resource in politics and economics, countries with the most weakly institution-
alized systems are also characterized by widespread use of force. In Central 
America, public-private negotiations regarding the access and preservation of 
political power have turned to the use of violence to enforce pacts and to elim-
inate opposition (Argueta, 2014, p. 211). This may involve the use of threats, 
kidnappings, assault and murder. As documented in a number of high profile 
cases,1 Guatemala stands out as the country with the highest incidence of intra-
elite violence. Interviews with public and private elites have also disclosed re-
peated threats and violence against them or their families, often by alternative 
elite networks. In such contexts, military and private security services are in 
high demand. Retired military officers have achieved key positions in elite 
networks, and this has also provided them with economic gain. Thus a recent 
publication on elite networks in Guatemala coins the term ‘military-business-
strategies’ (Anonymous, 2014), resembling what Vadim Volkov calls violent 
entrepreneurship, defined as a set of organizational decisions and action strate-
gies enabling the conversion of organized force (or organized violence) into 
money or other market resources on a permanent basis (Volkov, 2002). 
 The third main resource is information. What initially strikes any researcher 
attempting to investigate Central American political economy is the difficulty 
in accessing information. Information on the ownership, turnover and profits of 
businesses is scarce and often unreliable (see Bull et al., 2014, p. 18-19). Thus, 
the ability of the state to tax private actors is decreased. As argued by a former 
minister of finance in Guatemala: ‘It is well known that in practice, many Gua-
temalan companies keep three books: what they show to the SAT [the tax au-
thority] that reflects extremely low profits or losses in order to pay low taxes; 
what they show to the banks to get loans, where they increase their profits to 
appear very successful; and the true accounts, that are secret’ (Fuentes Knight, 
2012, p. 22). Indeed, systematic strategies to hinder the state’s ability to tax is 
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perhaps the best-documented of elite practices to undermine institutions 
(Schneider, 2012; Noe Pino, 2014). Public institutions also suffer from a lack 
of transparency. The Costa Rican initiative Estado de la Región made a heroic 
effort to collect data on public institutions in the region but had to leave the 
task uncompleted in spite of the significant amount of time and resources al-
ready invested (Vargas Cullell, 2014, p. 29-30). The reasons are almost too ob-
vious: while strong institutions systematically collect data on their budgets, terri-
torial presence, payrolls, and day-to-day operations, weak institutions do not.  
 However, information does exist. Although there is no guarantee of access 
to information in weakly institutionalized contexts, information is also not pro-
tected by institutional guarantees. Therefore, controlling such access or finding 
means to access information has become an important political and economic 
asset. Information circulates within networks, and those in the position to con-
trol information have become relevant nodes in a network (Garay et al., 2010, 
p. 27). Information is not only gathered in licit manners for legal and legitimate 
purposes, but also illegally through, for example, illegal wiretapping and other 
forms of surveillance, and this is clearly not something that only criminal 
groups are involved in. Legal businesses and public officials also engage in 
illegal information gathering to get a competitive edge over adversaries, to un-
dermine competitors’ legitimacy, to collect evidence used in processes of 
blackmail, and for many other purposes. While the exchange of information is 
conducted secretively, media also plays an important role in information con-
trol through the use of ‘selective leakages’, placing false information, and par-
ticipating in obstructing the search for accurate information by journalists 
and/or public officials.  
 The fourth main resource is ideas and ideologies, including religion. While 
the above presents a picture of the Central American political economy as run 
by individuals and networks that are largely motivated by a self-serving pursuit 
of wealth and power, the role played by ideas and common values in stabiliz-
ing networks and interactions within networks should not be underestimated. 
Elite networks control institutions aimed at influencing ideas and ideologies in 
society at large (i.e. media, universities, think tanks), thus framing political 
issues and legitimizing actions. These supply visions of society that allow 
elites to sustain their privileges, but often fail to explicitly recognize the influ-
ence that ideas and ideology have on their positions. Recent research shows 
that at least three major ‘ideological frameworks’ have deeply affected the 
mind-set of Central American elites in past years, with attempts to convey 
them to the public at large: anti-communism, neoliberalism and religion. The 
distinction between these three categories is often blurred. Elite networks em-
ploy a mixture of ideological frameworks in discourse as well as in the practice 
to mobilize action and strengthen trust within networks, while justifying exclu-
sion and repression against outsiders.  
 Let us briefly review these ideological frameworks. Anti-communism has 
often blurred into anti-terrorism. The idea of being under threat from a left-
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wing conspiracy unified the elite during the Cold War, but more than 20 years 
after its end the ‘internal enemy’ paradigm is still alive. In the 1990s, diverse 
social movements were given the ‘communist’ stamp, while more recently 
communism has been associated with Chavism and ALBA, in addition to a 
broad array of social movements that are currently increasingly involved in 
socio-environmental conflicts. In turn, ‘anti-communism’ has justified elite 
actions ranging from coup d’états to persecution of social movements activists. 
Neoliberalism unified elites from the 1990s on, and provided an ideological 
framework to pursue the interests of a significant segment of the business 
community, particularly that which was associated with transnational capital. 
This was no coincidence: while the local elites invested in universities and 
business schools, international agencies, and particularly the AID, spent large 
amounts of money on business associations and think tanks attempting to 
strengthen the support for liberalization, privatization and the conversion to 
non-traditional exports (Rosa, 1993; Sojo, 1992). This effort is continued today 
by old and new think tanks (Valdez, 2014). Although neoliberalism never actu-
ally managed to encompass the entire business-community, nor be predomi-
nantly supported in actual practices, it justified policies that in effect weakened 
some networks and strengthened others. Finally, religion is particularly ad-
vanced by certain evangelical and Catholic organizations. The most popular 
evangelical churches have a strong ‘prosperity gospel’ component that has 
proved attractive to both those searching for a spiritual community to endorse 
their individualistic world view and to others aspiring to climb the sociopoliti-
cal ladder. This particular religious affiliation has served to strengthen ties with 
elite groups operating in different spheres (politics, culture, business), as well 
as to open doors for new actors/families with financial resources to enter into 
elite networks. The largest evangelical churches function as large companies 
with international ties and may therefore also serve to form international net-
works. (Christensen Bjune, 2012). However, Catholic organizations such as 
Opus Dei remain the basis for elite networks across the region, and in Nicara-
gua the Catholic Church has been a more important basis for elite networks.  
Concluding remarks: The study of institutions penetrated by elite 
networks  
Studying weak institutions is a difficult task since they notoriously collect little 
and often unreliable information about their operations. Furthermore, as infor-
mation is a precious resource that is often guarded with the use of force, doing 
academic research in contexts of weak institutions often goes hand in hand 
with great degrees of risk. The reference  in this article to two studies that had 
to be published anonymously testifies to this. However, in order to find ways 
of strengthening institutions and thus improve this situation, it is necessary to 
understand the historical processes through which institutions came to be weak 
as well as how and by whom they are undermined or strengthened in day-to-
Benedicte Bull: Towards a Political Economy of Weak Institutions  |  125 
 
day practices today. I have suggested here that by focusing on elites, the net-
works they form and the resources that they command, we may come closer to 
an understanding of how weak institutions are kept weak or strengthened.  
 Studying elites is no easy task, as they are notoriously difficult to access, 
and are often more able to manage the information they provide than other 
groups. Nevertheless, attempting to systematize the pieces of information that 
exist on elites and the resources they control may be necessary to get the an-
swers to the core questions of political economy: who has power/resources? 
How are resources deployed in the pursuit of economic, political and other 
goals? What are the results? And the most important: how may positive change 
occur?  
 In the Central American context characterized by a complex interplay be-
tween the economy and politics in highly transnational economies with blurred 
lines between illicit and licit activities, studying elites, their networks and the 
resources that the network-nodes command is a necessary complement to the 
study of formal institutions. It would also be a contribution to the debate on 
who supports and who undermines democracy in Central America. The left 
sees an all-powerful monolithic economic and political elite as the main obsta-
cle to democracy, while the right perceives the threat as coming from the 
masses often associated with communism, terrorism or organized crime. Rather 
than such clear-cut dividing lines and polarization, we should see a diversity of 
shifting political alliances and constellations that break at some point when 
actors within a network disagree or transgress tacit agreements. Yet focusing 
on elites, networks and resources should never replace the study of formal or-
ganizations including political parties, state institutions, companies and busi-
ness groups. Rather, by understanding how these institutions are embedded in 
and penetrated by networks, we can understand why they work the way they do.  
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Note 
1. This includes the Gerardi-case, the case against ex-president Portillo, and the plot set up 
by businessman Roberto Rosenberg. 
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